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Note
When Added Hurdles Cause Actual Prejudice:
Exempting Knowing-Use-of-Perjured-Testimony
Claims from Brecht Analysis on Collateral
Review
Melanie A. Johnson
INTRODUCTION
Early one December morning in 1994, a gunman walked into
a bar in Erie, Pennsylvania, and opened fire, killing one patron
and injuring another before fleeing the scene.1 Three years later,
with little evidence to go on, a man named Vance Haskell was
formally charged as the shooter.2 The charge was based exclusively on circumstantial evidence and eyewitness testimony.3 By
the time his trial rolled around, only a single witness, Antoinette
Blue, was able to consistently identify Haskell as the shooter.4
Haskell was convicted of first-degree murder, with Blue’s
testimony serving as the primary evidence against him.5 He was
 J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A. 2010,
University of Oregon. I would like to thank the staff and editors of Minnesota
Law Review—particularly Torie Watkins, R. David Hahn, Jakob Brecheisen,
Mel Pulles, and Ronald Waclawski—for their help in preparing this Note for
publication. Thank you also to Erik, Lizzy, Mariah, and my beloved friends in
Minnesota for inspiring me to be a better advocate, and to my family in Oregon
for their love and support. Copyright © 2019 by Melanie A. Johnson.
1. Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 139, 141 (3d Cir.
2017).
2. Id. at 141.
3. Id. at 140.
4. Forty witnesses were called to testify at Haskell’s trial. Of the four who
ever claimed to be able to identify Haskell as the shooter, three were unable or
unwilling to identify the shooter consistently. Id. The fourth, Antoinette Blue,
provided a seemingly strong eyewitness identification, testifying that she had
not only seen Haskell pull the trigger, she had met him in town several weeks
before the shooting and smoked marijuana with him in the parking lot twenty
minutes prior. Id. at 143. Blue came to police with this testimony three years
after the shooting, after she had been picked up on two warrants and was awaiting charges in Erie County Jail. Id. at 143.
5. See id. at 145.
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sentenced to life in prison, with an additional fifteen to thirty
months tacked on for other charges.6 More than twenty years
later, Haskell challenged his conviction before the Third Circuit.7 He posed one key question: If an incarcerated person
learns that the state knowingly presented false testimony in order to secure a conviction against him, how likely does it have to
be that knowledge of the truth could have affected the jury’s verdict before a reviewing court will grant a new trial?8
Prosecutors are barred from falsifying evidence by both
strict professional ethical standards9 and more than eighty years
of case law.10 If such misconduct is discovered immediately after
trial, the impact of this discovery can be dramatic.11 On direct
review, if the state is found to have suppressed evidence material
6. Haskell v. Folina, Civil Action No. 10-149 Erie, 2015 WL 5227855, at *8
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2015), rev’d sub nom. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 139.
7. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 145.
8. See id. Haskell argues, and the Third Circuit agrees, that he only needs
to establish the existence of a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony
could have affected the judgment of the jury. The State argues that such claims
must meet the actual-prejudice standard, requiring Haskell to show that the
“error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury’s verdict.” Id. at 152.
9. See AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION §§ 3-1.4(b), 3-6.6(c), 3-6.8(a). Prosecutors may face punishment
from their own bar for some types of misconduct, but the rules differ from state
to state. In Minnesota, prosecutors are often only required to “make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense.” MINN. R.
PROF ’ L CONDUCT 3.8(d).
10. See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 103 n.2 (1935) (asserting
that the presentation of false testimony or suppression of evidence favorable to
the accused by a prosecutor violates Due Process).
11. If misconduct is discovered during the time period for direct appeal,
convictions can be reversed, reversed and remanded for retrial, or, if the prosecutor takes an action that causes the defendant to move for mistrial and results
in the trial court granting the motion, barred for retrial under the principles of
double jeopardy. See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 38 A.3d 828, 840 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2011) (finding that double jeopardy principles apply when a prosecutor acts
intentionally to prejudice a defendant’s right to fair retrial by defying court instructions intended to prevent taint of the complaining witness); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q.
713, 815–16 (1999).
Prosecutors themselves may face punishment for unethical conduct, including possible criminal prosecution for intentional acts. However, it can be difficult to seek civil remedies against unethical prosecutors—the Supreme Court
held that prosecutors are absolutely immune for any actions that were “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 815–
19 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). While this “absolute
immunity” has been dialed back in recent years, Imbler reflects reviewing
courts’ reluctance to cast judgment on the action of state prosecutors. Id. at 819.
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to the defendant’s case, including by obscuring the truth about a
testifying witness, the defendant’s conviction must be overturned.12 But once the defendant has exhausted his state appellate remedies, and the conviction becomes final, correcting prosecutorial misconduct becomes more of a challenge.13
Historically, on both direct and collateral review, when a defendant claimed that the prosecutor in his case knowingly presented or failed to correct false testimony, his claims were analyzed under the materiality standard established by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Agurs.14 This standard simply
asked whether it was reasonably likely that the jury’s verdict
could have been affected by knowledge of the truth.15 But in the
mid-1990s, the Supreme Court began making substantial
changes to habeas jurisprudence.16 Since then, many federal
courts have argued that a second prong must be added to the
materiality analysis of all constitutional trial errors raised on
collateral review, including perjured-testimony claims.17 This
prong, sometimes called the Brecht hurdle, requires the trial error, already material under the reasonable-likelihood standard,
to have caused “actual prejudice”—that is, substantial harm—to
the petitioner’s case.18
For twelve years, only one U.S. court of appeals diverged
from this approach.19 In 2005, the Ninth Circuit held that the
existing materiality standard used on direct appeal was sufficient for perjured-testimony claims raised on collateral review,
justifying its decision on grounds that a conviction obtained
12. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
13. Even defining “prosecutorial misconduct” under law can be a challenge.
The Supreme Court has said that “the touchstone of due process analysis in
cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).
14. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104.
15. This standard is called the “reasonable likelihood” standard. Agurs, 427
U.S. at 120 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
16. See generally A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of “New
Rules” and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1 (2002) (explaining the changing landscape of habeas jurisprudence);
Bennett L. Gershman, The Gate Is Open but the Door Is Locked: Habeas Corpus
and Harmless Error, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 115, 124–28 (1994) (analyzing
changes to habeas jurisprudence in the Rehnquist Court contemporaneously in
1990s).
17. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).
18. Id.
19. See Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)).
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through “perjurious or deceptive means” weakens “the entire
foundation of our system of justice.”20 In August 2017, the Third
Circuit joined this minority view.21 The Third Circuit found that
knowledge of facts pertaining to a key witness’s credibility posed
a “reasonable, and significant, likelihood of affecting the judgment of the jury” and noted that even if the State had not solicited the false evidence, it had permitted the testimony to go uncorrected, therefore violating the defendant’s due process rights
and requiring the conviction to be set aside.22
This Note discusses a deepening circuit split over whether
habeas petitioners, seeking freedom as a matter of constitutional
right, must meet an added actual-prejudice hurdle when raising
perjured-testimony claims on collateral review, or if the mere
possibility that the suppressed truth could have affected the
jury’s verdict renders the claim sufficient for the court to grant
relief.
Part I discusses the two standards currently used by federal
courts to weigh the materiality of trial errors stemming from
prosecutorial misconduct, analyzing the way these standards
have changed over time, highlighting the classification of constitutional errors as “trial” or “structural,” and detailing a fundamental shift in the way these errors were evaluated by appellate
and post-conviction courts from 1963 to 1995.23 It also addresses
the difference between collateral and direct review, in order to
explain in Part II why the Circuits continue to disagree on
whether these procedures should be treated differently.
Part II discusses the circuit split, the courts’ varying approaches to materiality analysis, and the differing fact patterns
in each case that led petitioners to raise these perjured-testimony claims.24
Part III analyzes why the Third Circuit was right to join the
Ninth in maintaining the reasonable-likelihood standard for perjured-testimony claims raised on collateral review and why the
other Circuits, including those still undecided, should create a
bright-line rule by abandoning actual-prejudice analysis for all
20. Id. at 988.
21. Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 2017)
(describing the State’s failure to correct false testimony as a “corruption of the
truth-seeking function of the trial process” (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104
(1976))).
22. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 146 .
23. Infra notes 25–87.
24. Infra notes 89–175.
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Brady claims. It argues that knowing abuse of prosecutorial discretion, including the introduction of perjured or false testimony,
should be a grave enough concern to justify retaining the more
defendant-friendly standard on collateral review, or even reclassifying such claims as structural errors subject to immediate reversal.
I. REVIEWING PERJURED TESTIMONY CLAIMS
This Part provides some background on the two standards
at play in the deepening circuit split over materiality standards.
The reasonable-likelihood standard, widely used to determine
materiality of knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony claims on direct review, has been adopted by the Third and Ninth Circuits
for habeas petitions on collateral review.25 Meanwhile, the twoprong actual-prejudice standard, based on the Brecht approach
to constitutional trial error, has been adopted by the First, Sixth,
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits for all knowing-use-of-perjuredtestimony claims on final review.26 Section A delves into the writ
of habeas corpus and how collateral review differs from direct
review. Section B then addresses the type of judicial review afforded to various constitutional errors and how prosecutorial
misconduct is generally characterized. Section C discusses the
methods used by reviewing courts to determine the impact of
such misconduct on the petitioner’s trial, while Section D examines the shifting jurisprudence around prosecutorial suppression
claims when raised on collateral review.
A. FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF MAY BE SOUGHT ON COLLATERAL
REVIEW
The writ of habeas corpus allows individuals to challenge
the underlying legality of their incarceration by giving a court
the ability to afford relief “to those grievously wronged.”27 Habeas relief for petitioners in state custody may be pursued in
25. See, e.g., Haskell, 866 F.3d at 146; Hayes, 399 F.3d at 988.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Roy, 855 F.3d 1133, 1231 (11th Cir. 2017);
United States v. Clay, 720 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir. 2013); Rosencrantz v. Lafler
568 F.3d 577, 588 (6th Cir. 2009); Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 267 (1st Cir.
1995).
27. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 621 (1993). Habeas petitioners
seek immediate release as a remedy for these wrongs. Robin A. Colombo, Brecht
v. Abrahamson: Hard Justice for State Prisoners?, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1103, 1115
n.120 (1994) (“[F ] ederal courts have the power and duty to provide the remedy
of release for those deprived of their freedom without due process.” (citing Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426–27, 438 (1963))). “[T]he writ does not require a court
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state court under local post-conviction statutes and in federal
court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.28 Review of these petitions (called
“collateral review”) must be based on the factual record from
state court, plus any newly discovered evidence “that could not
have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”29
Federal collateral review generally follows any direct appeals at the state level (“direct review”),30 as well as state collateral review.31 Generally speaking, direct review “afford[s] defendants the opportunity to challenge the merits of a judgment
and allege errors of law or fact,” while collateral review “provide[s] an independent and civil inquiry into the validity of a
conviction and sentence, and as such [is] generally limited to
challenges to constitutional, jurisdictional, or other fundamental
violations that occurred at trial.”32 The burden of proof also
shifts between direct and collateral review from the prosecution
to the convicted petitioner.33 This burden-shifting mechanism in-

to determine a prisoner’s innocence or guilt, but . . . guards against illegal imprisonment.” Mark R. Barr, The Not-So-Great Writ: An Analysis of Recent Tenth
Circuit Decisions Reflecting the Current Difficult in Obtaining Habeas Corpus
Relief for State Prisoners, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 407, 407 (2003).
28. For state post-conviction relief, see, for example, MINN. STAT. § 589
(2017). For federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).
29. § 2254(e)(2).
30. Direct review is considered the “principal way to challenge a conviction.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 620. Defendants have an automatic right of appeal,
subject to strict time limits. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b) (requiring defendant to file notice of appeal within fourteen days of entry of judgment or within fourteen days
after filing of a timely appeal by the government). Although errors found after
the timeline for appeal has passed may be corrected on collateral review, “[i]t is
more appropriate, whenever possible, to correct errors reachable by appeal rather than remit the parties to a new collateral proceeding.” Bartone v. United
States, 375 U.S. 52, 54 (1963) (per curiam).
31. State post-conviction relief must be pursued first; a federal writ may
only be granted if the applicant has “exhausted the remedies available” in state
court or if the state lacks appropriate corrective processes. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
state inmates have one year from the date of conviction to petition for federal
habeas relief. Id. § 2244(d); see also Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545 (2011). The timer
on this statute of limitations is paused during pendency of any state post-conviction claim or motion. Id. at 549.
32. Graham v. Borgen, 483 F.3d 475, 479 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
33. Before Brecht v. Abrahamson, the government bore the burden on collateral review of showing that a constitutional error in a petitioner’s case was
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” By requiring a showing of “actual prejudice” to the petitioner’s case before a state conviction may be overturned on the
basis of constitutional error, the Brecht Court shifted the burden from the state
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creases the degree of challenge faced by petitioners seeking habeas relief.34
The writ of habeas corpus, in short, acts as the judicial
equivalent of a Hail Mary pass for incarcerated individuals. In
the habeas cases discussed below, the petitioners raised underlying due process concerns as the constitutional grounds for collateral review.
B. DEFENDANTS HAVE A DUE PROCESS RIGHT AGAINST
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Criminal defendants are entitled to procedural due process
in a court of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.35
This constitutional right is violated when the government knowingly presents or fails to correct false testimony in a criminal
proceeding.36 The state must disclose all material evidence relevant to the case to defense counsel;37 failure to disclose such evidence, whether by negligence or design, is a responsibility borne
by the prosecutor.38
When a defendant alleges that his constitutional rights have
been violated, the violation is categorized either as a structural
error or a trial error.39 Trial errors occur during the presentation

to the prisoner. Linda Greenhouse, Overview of the Term: The Court’s Counterrevolution Comes in Fits and Starts, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1993, at E4–E5; see
also Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 2017).
34. See Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vison of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 29–31 (2010) (discussing petitioners’ difficulty in meeting the
burden of proof on collateral review).
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“To
suppose that ‘due process of law’ meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and
another in the Fourteenth is too frivolous to require elaborate rejection.”).
36. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972); Hayes v. Brown,
399 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Due process protects defendants against the
knowing use of any false evidence by the State, whether it be by document, testimony, or any other form of admissible evidence.” (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264, 269 (1959))); Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 242 (3d Cir. 2004).
37. This standard was established in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963).
38. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154.
39. An error violating a defendant’s constitutional rights is considered a
constitutional error. See Gavin R. Tisdale, A New Look at Constitutional Errors
in a Criminal Trial, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1665, 1669–73 (2016). “To find structural error, a court must find that the error: (1) did not occur during the presentation of the case to the jury, (2) cannot be quantitatively assessed on appeal, or
(3) affects the framework in which the trial proceeds.” Id. at 1678 (examining
the legal landscape after Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (explaining
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of the case to the jury and are subject to harmless-error analysis;40 these errors must be assessed in light of all evidence presented to the jury.41 The harmless-error analysis applied to trial
errors “represents an accommodation between a criminal defendant’s interest in receiving a remedy for the violation of a constitutional right and the state’s interest in preserving convictions where the error did not affect the outcome of the trial.”42
Structural errors, on the other hand, affect the framework
within which the trial proceeds, creating a fundamental defect
in the courtroom environment so inherently unjust as to require
immediate remedy.43 Common structural errors include judicial
bias, exclusion of jurors on racial grounds, failure to recognize
the right to counsel, and violation of the right to a public trial.44
Prosecutorial misconduct was established as a form of constitutional trial error by Brady v. Maryland, which marked a
shift in the jurisprudence surrounding discovery and evidentiary
withholding.45 The Supreme Court in Brady found that certain
forms of evidentiary suppression46 by the prosecution, whether
made in good faith or bad, brought the substantive fairness of
trial into question and were therefore automatically material to
the case.47 If an incident is material under Brady, it can never

that the use of perjured testimony by the state has not been deemed to “affect[ ]
the framework within which the trial proceeds”)).
40. Under harmless-error analysis, a new trial is required “only if the state
can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the
verdict.” Tisdale, supra note 39, at 1670.
41. See Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 589 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Shih
Wei Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2003)).
42. John H. Blume & Stephen P. Garvey, Harmless Error in Federal Habeas Corpus After Brecht v. Abrahamson, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 183
(1993).
43. Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 589 (citing Shih Wei Su, 335 F.3d at 126).
44. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997).
45. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 (1963); see also Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 708–09 (2006).
46. The Brady rule arguably applies in three cases: (1) the government’s
failure to provide requested exculpatory evidence; (2) the government’s failure
to volunteer exculpatory evidence; and (3) the government’s knowing presentation of or failure to correct false testimony. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 103–07 (1976).
47. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
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be dismissed as harmless.48 This was a game-changing shift in
jurisprudence for prosecutors.49 Under Brady, the State was required to share with defense counsel any exculpatory or impeaching evidence material to the guilt or innocence of a defendant.50 Failing to correct testimony that the prosecutor knows at
the time to be false, then, is a Brady violation.51
In the years since Brady, the knowing use of perjured testimony has continued to be treated as inherently more problematic than other Brady violations.52 Courts describe such conduct
as an abuse of prosecutorial discretion and trust, as well as a
“corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.”53
In Giglio v. United States, the Supreme Court found that “a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair” and should be set aside.54 Yet, despite creating such fundamental procedural inequity, prosecutorial
48. “A finding of materiality of the evidence is required under Brady. . . . A
new trial is required if ‘the false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury . . . .’” Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (citations omitted); see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Harmless-error analysis asks whether the constitutional error had “substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750, 776 (1946)).
49. Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129,
140 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (describing how the adversarial process encourages prosecutors and defense attorneys to conceal evidence that the jury might
find helpful in establishing the truth).
50. Brady, 373 U.S. at 90–91.
51. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 155. It should be noted that most courts believe that
the prosecution has no obligation to disclose exculpatory information acquired
after the conviction. See Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68
(2009) (“A criminal defendant proved guilty after a fair trial does not have the
same liberty interests as a free man.”). This, however, could change if more jurisdictions adopt a recent amendment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, requiring the prosecutor to “promptly disclose” any “new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did
not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF ’ L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
52. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976); see, e.g., Browning
v. Baker, 875 F.3d 444, 461–63 (9th Cir. 2017) (granting habeas relief on claim
that prosecutors failed to correct witness’s false testimony on the status of his
plea bargain with the State); United States v. Barham, 595 F.2d 231, 242–43
(5th Cir. 1979) (granting habeas relief on claim that prosecutor failed to correct
false testimony concerning promises of leniency made to state witnesses, despite
defense counsel receiving a letter informing prosecutor of the promises).
53. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104.
54. Id. at 103. “[T]he same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” Giglio, 405
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misconduct in the form of willfully-presented perjured testimony
is not generally considered a structural error because it occurs
only during the progress of trial.55 It has been established that
such misconduct can become structurally problematic if an incident is particularly egregious or can be identified as part of a
larger pattern of misconduct.56 However, while the argument
could be made that prosecutorial dishonesty inherently “[infect[s] the integrity of the proceeding,”57 this approach has not
been widely adopted by courts addressing perjured-testimony
claims on collateral review.
C. DETERMINING THE IMPACT OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
ON PETITIONER’S CASE
A decade after Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court split
potential Brady withholding violations into three categories:
failing to disclose evidence, failing to disclose evidence after a
defense request, and knowingly using false testimony.58 These
three categories were initially assigned the same materiality
standard for determining their effect on the outcome of the trial:
reasonable likelihood. In order to establish a due process claim
under this materiality standard, a petitioner must show that
there exists a reasonable likelihood that an instance of evidentiary withholding could have affected the judgment of the jury.59
U.S. at 153 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). This remains
in line with the Brady rule that any violations found material could not be dismissed as harmless error. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
55. Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005); Shih Wei Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2003).
56. The Court in Brecht reserved “the possibility that in an unusual case, a
deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial type . . . might so infect the
integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant of habeas relief, even if it did
not substantially influence the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619, 638 n.9 (1993); see, e.g., Watts v. Mahally, 247 F. Supp. 3d 605, 607, 614
n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (finding per se reversible error in the trial judge’s “decision
to instruct the jury with an obviously irrelevant, inadmissible and highly prejudicial fact dehors the record, over defense counsel’s objection”); see also infra
note 79 and accompanying text.
The Sixth Circuit has also noted that perjured-testimony claims could be
considered structural error, free from harmless-error analysis, if the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that they were. See Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 589
(6th Cir. 2009); infra Part III.C.
57. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638 n.9.
58. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103–07 (finding that the rule in Brady applies in
three “quite different” situations that might arise at trial).
59. A petitioner seeking to establish a due process claim under the Agurs
standard must show that (1) a government witness committed perjury; (2) the
prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was false; (3) the
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The reasonable-likelihood standard, sometimes called the Agurs
standard, sets a strict course for prosecutors, recognizing the
state’s obligation not to deceive,60 as well as its obligation to correct.61
Yet, despite assigning all three categories the same materiality standard, the Agurs Court was particularly troubled by perjured-testimony claims, which the Court felt lacked the potential
innocence of intent inherent in the two evidentiary-withholding
categories.62
Brady jurisprudence continued to evolve, and, nine years
later, the Supreme Court created a new standard for any Brady
claims alleging evidentiary withholding: “reasonable probability.”63 To determine whether a material error had occurred, this
new standard required reviewing courts to find a reasonable
probability that the suppressed evidence would have affected the
jury’s verdict.64 Yet, the Court apparently had the same concerns
in mind during Bagley as it did during Agurs, because perjuredtestimony claims were expressly left under the reasonable-likelihood standard.65
While both materiality standards leave room for an alleged
instance of prosecutorial misconduct to be overlooked as harmless error if it fails to meet the impact requirement of the standard,66 the reasonable-likelihood standard is less discerning than
false testimony was not corrected; and (4) there is a reasonable possibility that
the perjured testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Lambert
v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 242 (3d Cir. 2004).
60. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972).
61. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108. By combining these standards, Agurs created
an obligation to set aside convictions obtained following the state’s failure to
correct knowing or reckless deception by its prosecutors.
62. Id. at 109–12 (noting a prosecutor’s duty and obligations to the overriding concepts and interests of justice).
63. This failure to disclose must have occurred after general or specific requests for information by defense counsel. For instance, defendants are permitted to ask prosecutors to provide information about any inducements offered to
testifying government witnesses and, under Brady and Bagley, prosecutors
must share this information or risk having the requested witnesses’ testimony
suppressed. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (discussing
the impairment of the adversarial process if prosecutor fails to respond to Brady
request).
64. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
65. Id. at 713 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Both standards also address the same threshold question: Has a constitutional error occurred? See Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 267 (1st Cir. 1995).
Again, according to Giglio, if an incident is found material under Brady, a constitutional error has occurred that can never be dismissed as harmless. Giglio
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (requiring a new trial if the false
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the reasonable-probability standard, opting for a mere possibility of jury impact over a probability.67 This difference means that
the petitioner in a perjured-testimony case faces a lower materiality burden based on the nature of the claim. Yet no matter
which materiality standard is used, once the requirements of either standard are met, the Brady rule remains: If a Brady violation is found material, it may never be dismissed as harmless.68
D. SHIFTING JURISPRUDENCE AROUND BRADY CLAIMS RAISED
BY HABEAS PETITIONERS ON COLLATERAL REVIEW
On appeal, once a Brady violation meets its assigned materiality standard, Agurs states that the conviction in question
“must be set aside” and a new trial ordered.69 However, since
1993, constitutional trial errors asserted in a federal habeas petition, unlike those on direct review, must meet an added actualprejudice hurdle.70 This Section will discuss this actual-prejudice analysis and the rationale behind it, as well as address the
controversy involved in applying the standard to Brady violations.
1. Adding an Actual-Prejudice Hurdle for Perjured-Testimony
Claims on Collateral Review
The Agurs reasonable-likelihood standard initially applied
to claims raised on both direct and collateral review. Then in
1993, a new line of jurisprudence came crashing in against
Agurs. After years of decisions strongly limiting habeas relief,71
testimony could, with any reasonable likelihood, affect the judgment of the
jury).
67. Compare Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683–84 (finding a reasonable likelihood
that jury’s verdict could have been different had the prosecutor not misleadingly
induced defense counsel into believing that key government witnesses could not
be impeached with inducements received from the State), with United States v.
Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 127–28 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding that the government’s
presentation of false testimony was not reasonably likely to have affected the
jury’s verdict where jurors found the defendant not guilty on the counts related
to the testimony in question).
68. See supra note 48.
69. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (citing Giglio, 405 U.S.
at 154).
70. Cases on direct review at the state level may use the local standard,
often the more defendant-friendly “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding that before a
federal constitutional error can be harmless, a court must declare the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
71. During this time, criminal convictions jumped, an increase credited to
an expanding criminal code. See Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of
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the Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson determined that
due process violations raised on collateral review must pass one
last obstacle: actual prejudice.72 Actual prejudice, sometimes
called the Brecht hurdle, added a second layer of harmless-error
analysis to existing materiality standards, inquiring whether
the material due process violation also had a “substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”73
This secondary hurdle created a distinct possibility that a constitutional error previously found material to the defendant’s
case might ultimately be found “harmless” under Brecht.
The Court offered several reasons why existing materiality
standards for constitutional trial errors should be elevated by
this new prong of analysis on collateral review. First, courts possess a longstanding interest in maintaining the finality of convictions that survived direct review within the state court system.74 The Court believed that assigning the government a less
stringent materiality burden after direct review would help
maintain that finality.75 Furthermore, comity and a respect for
federalism discourage federal courts from doing anything that
might impede on a state’s “sovereign power to punish offenders”
and its “good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.”76
The Court also noted a desire to avoid “encourag[ing] habeas
petitioners to relitigate their claims.”77 This motivation highlights the final rationale: the fear that “liberal allowance” of the
habeas writ will “degrade[] the prominence of the trial itself”—
i.e., that trials will cease to be treated with respect if habeas relief is too easily granted.78

Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (2010) (detailing the history of the
“Great Writ” from the Warren Court era to the passage of the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996). Meanwhile, federal habeas filings
were limited in a number of ways, including eliminating most Fourth Amendment claims from habeas review and removing the right to counsel for habeas
petitioners. Id. The Supreme Court also imposed the exhaustion and procedural
default requirements and applied res judicata to create a one-shot rule for federal habeas claims. Id.
72. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (denying habeas claim
raised by petitioner).
73. In other words, Brecht asks if a material rights violation caused any
actual prejudice to the defendant’s case at trial. Id. at 619.
74. Id. at 635.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 635 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 (1982)).
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However, even when the two-prong approach is applied to
constitutional errors on collateral review, the possibility remains
that a claim failing to reach the actual-prejudice threshold may
still result in an overturned conviction. The Supreme Court has
noted that a “deliberate and especially egregious” trial error
could “combine[] with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct
[and] so infect the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the
grant of habeas relief, even it did not substantially influence the
jury’s verdict.”79 The First Circuit later explained this as the Supreme Court stressing “the importance of considering the cumulative effect of all suppressed evidence in determining whether a
Brady violation occurred.”80 In other words, the supposed “harmlessness” of certain individual due process violations may not negate the overall impact at trial that a pattern of such misconduct
and violations may have.
2. When Perjured Testimony Gets Left Behind: Dialing Back
the Effect of Brecht on Brady Claims in Kyles v. Whitley
Almost immediately, Brecht received backlash as courts
struggled to apply the actual-prejudice hurdle to Brady claims
on collateral review.81 Appellants argued that the hurdle was redundant, noting that material Brady claims, as a rule, could not
be dismissed as harmless.82 In 1995, the Court addressed the issue in Kyles v. Whitley,83 creating an exemption from actual-prejudice analysis for Brady withholding claims analyzed under the
existing reasonable-probability standard.
The Court reasoned that any claim meeting the reasonableprobability standard was automatically material and could not
be dismissed as harmless error, even under Brecht.84 The Kyles
79. Id. at 654 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 18 (1967) (holding that the State failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable
doubt that repetitive comments and instructions to the jury focusing on the defendant’s failure to testify did not contribute to the petitioner’s conviction).
80. Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 272 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995)).
81. See generally Bennett L. Gershman, The Gate Is Open but the Door Is
Locked: Habeas Corpus and Harmless Error, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 115, 124–
28 (1994) (describing various analytical and doctrinal critiques of the Court’s
analysis in Brecht).
82. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
83. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
84. In other words, a constitutional violation meeting the reasonable-probability standard requires automatic reversal. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435; see also
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (“A ‘reasonable probability’ is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”).
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Court based its rationale on the history of the standard, explaining that while it had once adopted the “substantial and injurious
effect or influence” standard for constitutional errors on collateral review, it later rejected that standard as not placing a high
enough burden on the defendant.85 The Court reasoned
that, since the existing materiality standard for evidentiarywithholding claims already required “a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different,”86 such a claim
would automatically meet Brecht’s requirement that suppression must have had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict.87 Therefore, the Court reasoned, any
claim meeting the reasonable-probability standard automatically surpassed the standard for materiality established by
Brecht and could not be dismissed as harmless error.
However, the Court, perhaps sensing a rhetorical stalemate
over the weight of “likelihood” versus “probability,” declined to
extend this reasoning to the knowing use of perjured testimony,
explaining that the issue was not currently before them to decide.88 The Kyles Court’s reluctance to explicitly address the application of the Brecht hurdle to perjured-testimony claims
raised by habeas petitioners on collateral review soon led to the
Circuit split discussed in this Note.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Following Agurs, federal courts initially agreed on the use
of the reasonable-likelihood standard for federal and state perjured-testimony claims raised at all stages of the appeals and
post-conviction process. However, a push for less permissive habeas guidelines rumbled beneath the surface. Many viewed the
reasonable-likelihood standard as overly defendant-friendly,
particularly for cases on collateral review that had survived a
series of direct appeals and habeas petitions at the state level.
Federal courts sought to avoid upsetting the balance of state and
federal power.
85. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435–36 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750, 776 (1946)). See generally Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622–23
(1993) (re-assessing the “substantial and injurious effect” standard); United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (placing a higher burden on the defendant).
86. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 685 (White, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
87. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623.
88. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 n.7.
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This Part will detail the progression of the Circuit split—
how the Circuits, in a post-Kyles world, initially handled the issue of knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony claims on collateral
review and why some courts chose to adopt a more challenging
standard than the one faced on direct review. Section A explains
how the circuit split over the added-prejudice hurdle initially began, and Section B explores how the split progressed, addressing
the various defenses raised by each Circuit in dealing with facts
before them. Finally, Section C delves into the most recent circuit case to take a side in the split, Haskell v. Superintendent
Greene SCI,89 and explores why the Third Circuit chose to side
with the minority of courts on the issue of actual prejudice.
A. ESTABLISHING THE SPLIT: DETERMINING MATERIALITY OF
PERJURED-TESTIMONY CLAIMS AFTER KYLES V. WHITLEY
Until Brecht, “reasonable likelihood” was commonly accepted as the standard for knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony
claims at all points of litigation. But after Brecht, and then Kyles,
courts began to question the continued applicability of the unmodified Agurs standard on collateral review.
1. The First Circuit: Challenging the Reasonable-Likelihood
Standard
The First Circuit was the first to suggest that the Supreme
Court had intended to make a change to the reasonable-likelihood standard for perjured-testimony claims raised by habeas
petitioners. Gilday v. Callahan90 built its argument based on the
Supreme Court’s findings in Kyles v. Whitley earlier that year.91
The First Circuit interpreted Brecht’s newly-minted actual-prejudice hurdle as applying to all constitutional trial errors on collateral review, while accepting that Kyles removed the added
hurdle from Brady withholding claims.92 However, because
Kyles declined to decide whether this exemption applied to the
government’s knowing use of perjured testimony, the First Circuit reasoned that the Brecht hurdle must still be applied in this
particular category of Brady claims.93 Under this logic, Gilday
89. 866 F.3d 139, 139 (3d Cir. 2017).
90. 59 F.3d 257 (1st Cir. 1995).
91. Id. at 267–68 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436).
92. In Kyles, the Court had found that harmless-error analysis could not be
applied to Brady claims “arising in a habeas case outside the perjury-related
context.” Gilday, 59 F.3d at 267 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 n.7).
93. Id.

2019]

PERJURED TESTIMONY

1583

proposed that perjured-testimony claims on collateral review
face a two-pronged inquiry: “[W]as there a failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence, and, if yes, was such failure harmless?”94
The criminal offense at the heart of the Gilday casean
armed bank robbery (intended to “raise funds in support of radical political activities”) and the murder of a responding police
officerwas complex and politically sensitive.95 The First Circuit, seeming uncomfortable with the notion that applying a
more defendant-friendly standard might increase the likelihood
of finding reversible error in this case, spotted a solution in the
precedent set by Brecht.96 Despite the prosecutor’s “deliberate
strategy to misrepresent [witness] credibility and the knowing
acquiescence of [] false testimony,” and despite the court’s apparent contempt for these actions,97 the First Circuit in Gilday
held that it was prevented from overturning the conviction by
the actual-prejudice analysis in Brecht.98
On direct review, the state court had determined that the
prosecutors in Gilday had “improperly failed to disclose a deal
made with the attorney” of Michael Fleischer, a key witness.99
The Circuit, reviewing the issue de novo and applying the reasonable-likelihood standard, agreed that “the information withheld by the prosecutor would have provided the basis for powerful impeachment of Fleischer’s testimony;”100 however, upon
reaching the actual-prejudice hurdle, the Circuit court found
94. Id. at 268. Despite the fact that Kyles only explicitly refers to the knowing use of perjured testimony, the First Circuit extends its interpretation to
“equivalent” circumstances as noted in Bagley. Id. at 267. Rather than perjured
testimony, Gilday involves a situation in which the prosecutor withheld evidence about a key eyewitness that might have cast his identification of the defendant into doubt. Id. at 267 n.10.
95. Id. at 260.
96. Id. at 268.
97. Id. at 269–70 (noting that the State, by taking steps to actively suppress
information about the deal struck up with the testifying accomplice witnesses,
appears to agree with the conclusion that disclosure could have affected the jurors’ judgment).
98. Prosecutors are not relieved of disclosure duties by lack of a formal
agreement or by the witness’s lack of specific knowledge of the agreement. See,
e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683–84 (1985) (finding prosecutors’
failure to disclose key information in witness affidavits to be misleading and
remanding the case to lower court to determine whether there existed a “reasonable probability” that the result of petitioner’s trial would have been different with proper disclosure).
99. Gilday, 59 F.3d at 268.
100. Id. at 269.
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that even if the jury had assigned no weight to Fleischer’s testimony based on the suppressed impeachment evidence, “the substance of the case against Gilday would have remained the
same.”101 Gilday faced a case built on considerable evidence, and
Fleischer was a rebuttal witness tasked with “simply [restating]
the earlier testimony of another witness.”102 Of the three essential Brady claims presented by the petitioner in Gilday,103 the
First Circuit found that “none of the asserted nondisclosures, nor
all of them cumulatively constitute reversible error” under the
new standard.104
2. The Ninth Circuit: Rejecting Brecht’s Application to
Perjured-Testimony Claims on Collateral Review
The issue of Brecht as it applied to knowing-use-of-perjuredtestimony claims remained relatively unchallenged for the next
decade, until the Ninth Circuit broke from the First Circuit’s
lead and concluded that when the applicable test for a constitutional violation is derived from the materiality standard set by
Agurs in 1976, Brecht need not apply.105
Hayes v. Brown involved the prosecution of Blufford Hayes
for the 1980 murder of a motel manager and burglary of the motel office.106 An alleged accomplice to the crime, A.J. James, was
flown in for the trial, with prosecutors promising James that he
could return home after testifying.107 However, without James’s
knowledge, the prosecutor in Hayes’s case went further, promising James’s attorney that the witness would receive transac-

101. Id. at 269–70.
102. Id.
103. Gilday claimed error in (1) the government’s failure to disclose exculpatory statements from a non-testifying eyewitness; (2) the government’s failure
to disclose exculpatory statements by two trial witnesses; and (3) the government’s failure to correct false testimony presented by two accomplice-witnesses
who testified that no deals had been reached for their cooperation in trial. Id. at
271.
104. Id. at 267. Note that the First Circuit rejects these claims both under
the Brecht actual-prejudice hurdle and Brecht’s exception for cumulatively egregious conduct. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 n.9 (1993).
105. Violations requiring the Agurs standard under law include claims involving suppression, ineffective assistance of counsel, and perjured testimony.
Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing when Brecht’s
analysis does not apply).
106. For more information on the factual basis of Hayes v. Brown, see id. at
974–78.
107. Id. at 976–77.
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tional immunity for the manager’s murder and dismissal of unrelated felony charges in exchange for testifying.108 The prosecutor hoped to circumvent any questions that might reveal that
James had been offered a deal to testify, and so, to prevent this
information from reaching the trial judge and jury, James’s attorney agreed to keep the specifics of the deal from his client.109
After the trial, the witness, unaware of the deal on his behalf,
was returned to Florida on the prosecution’s dime, despite believing that he still faced pending charges in California.110 These
charges were later dismissed.111
The Ninth Circuit, upon reviewing the facts of the case,
found that it clearly showed that “the State knowingly presented
false evidence to the jury and made false representations to the
trial judge as to whether the State had agreed not to prosecute
James on his pending felony charges.”112
Much like the First Circuit in Gilday, the Ninth Circuit objected to the prosecutor’s attempt to make a covert deal with a
witness’s attorney that was not disclosed to the witness or the
court.113 Both Circuits agreed that such a violation likely met the
reasonable-likelihood standard, as disclosure of such a deal
would have “reduced substantially, or even destroyed” the testifying witness’s credibility on the stand.114 But while Gilday interpreted the recent cases of Brecht and Kyles as combining to
create a secondary hurdle for perjured-testimony claims,115 the
Ninth Circuit, reviewing such a claim for the first time under
this particular jurisprudence, took a different approach.116 The
court found that “[a]pplication of the Agurs ‘any reasonable likelihood’ standard necessarily foreclose[d] a Brecht harmless error

108. Id. at 977.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 978.
113. Id. at 987–88 (finding that the State’s failure to disclose information
about “powerful incentive[s]” offered to testifying witnesses threatens the integrity of the criminal justice system).
114. Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 269 (1st Cir. 1995).
115. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
116. Hayes, 399 F.3d at 984 (“[W]hen the Supreme Court has declared a materiality standard, as it has for this type of constitutional error, there is no need
to conduct a separate harmless error analysis. As the Supreme Court explained
in Kyles, when considering a similar question about applying the Bagley disclosure requirements, the required finding of materiality necessarily compels the
conclusion that the error was not harmless.”).
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analysis” and concluded that Kyles’s refusal to decide on perjured-testimony claims was mere dicta.117 “When the Supreme
Court has declared a materiality standard, as it has for this type
of constitutional error,” the Ninth Circuit explained, “there is no
need to conduct a separate harmless error analysis.”118
At the heart of the Ninth Circuit’s decision seemed to be its
clear offense at the blatant deception engaged in by the prosecution team in Hayes.119 Prosecutors are barred from presenting
false evidence, including false testimony,120 and the court sternly
noted that tricking a witness into lying on the stand “does
not . . . insulate the State from conforming its conduct to the requirements of due process.”121 The court called the State’s behavior “reprehensible,” noting that a witness’s lack of apparent complicity in the falsehood “is what gives the false testimony the ring
of truth, and makes it all the more likely to affect the judgment
of the jury.”122 The Ninth Circuit explained that the use of false
evidence violates the Fourteenth Amendment, noting that “[o]ne
of the bedrock principles of our democracy . . . is that the State
may not use false evidence to obtain a criminal conviction.”123
B. THE DEEPENING SPLIT: BUILDING SUPPORT FOR THE ADDEDPREJUDICE HURDLE
Despite the bold stance taken by the Ninth Circuit in Hayes,
twelve years passed and the remaining Circuits, despite sometimes vocalizing serious reservations about excusing such poor
prosecutorial behavior, fell in line behind the First Circuit and
the Brecht hurdle.

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 979–80 (noting that the prosecutor specifically represented to the
trial judge that no deal had been made for James’s testimony, eliciting sworn
testimony from James on that issue both on direct and re-direct examination,
and failing to correct the record at trial after doubling down on the witnesses’
credibility in closing argument). The Haskell court, in joining the Ninth Circuit
in this split, will be similarly irate about the prosecution’s reliance at trial on
testimony it knows to be false. Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d
139, 150 (3d Cir. 2017).
120. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
121. Hayes, 399 F.3d at 981 (“Few things are more repugnant to the constitutional expectations of our criminal system than covert perjury[.]” (quoting N.
Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001))).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 978 (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269).
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Their reasons varied. In 2009, the Sixth Circuit in Rosencrantz v. Lafler124 became the first to join Gilday in applying the
actual-prejudice hurdle to perjured-testimony claims on collateral review.125 Although the court called the decision a “close
call” case, it ultimately concluded that Brecht’s policy concerns
weighed heavier than the Ninth Circuit’s concerns about prosecutorial culpability.126
1. The Sixth Circuit in Rosencrantz v. Lafler
The knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony issue in Rosencrantz v. Lafler, a case involving sexual assault by a stranger,
involved falsehoods told by the victim witness about pretrial
communications she had had with the prosecutor in the case.127
While the Sixth Circuit objected to the prosecutor’s conduct in
failing to correct testimony from the victim that it knew was
false,128 the court noted that defense counsel had managed, despite this misconduct, to successfully impeach the victim’s testimony at several turns during cross-examination.129
Emphasizing that “most constitutional errors can be harmless,”130 the Sixth Circuit drew a line in the sand on the topic of
collateral review. The court asserted that Brecht’s actual-prejudice analysis must be applied to all constitutional trial errors
raised by habeas petitioners, with the exception of those explicitly exempted by Kyles, and that the Supreme Court had not
deemed knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony claims “to be ‘structural’ in the sense that they ‘affect[] the framework within which

124. 568 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2009).
125. Id. at 587–90 (finding the State’s failure to disclose victim’s false testimony material but ultimately harmless to the outcome of trial).
126. Id. at 589–90 (emphasizing the importance of pursuing “the prompt administration of justice” and limiting habeas relief to those “grievously wronged”)
(citation omitted).
127. Id. at 591–92.
128. Id. at 589 (“Certainly, the prosecutor’s behavior in this case constitutes
misconduct that we condemn.”).
129. Despite the witness and prosecution’s silence on the matter of prior conversations with the State, the defense elicited admissions from the witness victim on her history of criminal fraud, prior lies made under oath about the case,
and variations and inconsistencies in her testimony. Id. at 581. The Sixth Circuit in Rosencrantz found that after the defense had focused the jury on the
inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony, “it was up to the jury—not a federal
court conducting collateral review. . .—to sort [it] out.” Id. at 585–86 (citing
Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 992 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Tallman, J., dissenting)).
130. Id. at 589 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991)).
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the trial proceeds.’”131 The Sixth Circuit explained that this interpretation of knowing use of perjured testimony as a trial error
could explain Brecht’s creation of an “unusual case” exception for
patterns of prosecutorial misconduct that “so infect the integrity
of the proceeding.”132 The Sixth Circuit seemed to find that the
Ninth Circuit’s main error was the application of strict materiality to a perjured-testimony claim that it acknowledged was not
structural.133
2. The Eleventh Circuit in Trepal v. Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections
In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit in Trepal v. Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections134 followed the Sixth Circuit’s lead,
reasoning that the “more lenient . . . materiality standard leaves
room for the possibility that perjured testimony may be material
under [the reasonable-likelihood standard] but still be harmless
under Brecht.”135
Trepal involved a complicated poisoning murder and, unlike
the other perjured-testimony cases in this split, the false testimony in question came from an expert witness who overextended
his identification of the chemical evidence.136 This perjury claim
came to light about six years after the trial, when the Office of
the Inspector General issued a report criticizing the expert’s
work.137 Following the release of the report, the lower court in
an evidentiary hearing found that there was no reasonable likelihood that the result of the petitioner’s trial would have been
different had the false testimony been corrected—in other words,
the court found that no constitutional error had occurred at
all.138
131. Id. (quoting Shih Wei Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2003) (alteration in original)).
132. Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 n.9 (1993)).
133. The Sixth Circuit acknowledges that Giglio could be read as saying that
such error implicates structural concerns, but the Sixth Circuit seems to be
awaiting direction from above, noting that “the Supreme Court has yet to explicitly hold [knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony] errors as structural.” Id. at
589. The court explains that the Ninth Circuit in Hayes “erred in failing to distinguish false-testimony claims from Brady withholding claims.” Id. at 589–90
(citing Hayes, 399 F.3d at 984).
134. Trepal v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 1088 (11th Cir. 2012).
135. Id. at 1113.
136. Id. at 1100 (citing the OIG Report as criticizing the expert in presenting
testimony that was “stronger than his analytical results would support”).
137. Id. at 1091.
138. Id. at 1119–20. This appears to be a case of the lower court mixing its
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The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and
pointed to Chapman v. California, upon which the Agurs reasonable-likelihood standard was predicated.139 Chapman “rejected
the argument that the Constitution requires a blanket rule of
automatic reversal in the case of constitutional error,” concluding that some constitutional errors may be “so unimportant and
insignificant” in the grand scheme of their case as to be deemed
constitutionally harmless.140 The court reasoned that this potential insignificance is exactly the reason why constitutional errors
were later subdivided into “‘structural defects,’ which require automatic reversal,” and “‘trial errors,’ which are subject to harmless[-]error analysis.”141
The Eleventh Circuit’s application of the Brecht hurdle to
perjured-testimony claims raised on federal collateral review put
the onus on state courts to identify alleged constitutional errors
and evaluate their prejudicial effects early in the review process.142 The court’s greatest concern seemed not to be whether
this use of a heightened standard was fair to defendants, but
whether it was fair to the state courts that had previously
ruled.143 The Eleventh Circuit found that, after Brecht, the
harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard previously used
by Chapman could not be applied to cases on collateral review.144
Because habeas relief is supposed to be a last resort, the court
standards; the use of “would have” indicates a standard close to Bagley’s reasonable-probability standard for Brady withholding claims rather than the reasonable-likelihood “could have” standard used for the knowing use of perjured
testimony. The Eleventh Circuit, however, shrugs off the difference: “As a matter of logic, when answering the question posed by the [Agurs] standard, saying
that there is no reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different
is the same as saying that there is no reasonable likelihood that the verdict
could have been different.” Id. at 1120.
139. Id. at 1110–14.
140. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993) (quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967)).
141. Trepal, 684 F.3d at 1110–11.
142. What this ignores is that state courts may have failed in this duty for
any number of reasons: political pressure, tunnel vision, etc. The Eleventh Circuit’s view of Brecht fails to acknowledge that the issue may not have had the
opportunity to have been raised below under the lower standard.
143. Trepal, 684 F.3d at 1111 (“[S]tate courts are fully qualified to identify
constitutional error and evaluate its prejudicial effect on the trial process . . . and [they] often occupy a superior vantage point from which to evaluate
the effect of trial error . . . .”).
144. Id. (“Chapman was a direct-appeal case, and until Brecht, the Supreme
Court had not had occasion to squarely address whether the Chapman ‘harmless[-]beyond[-]a[-]reasonable[-]doubt standard’ applied to cases on collateral
review.” (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 630–38))).
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reasoned that it would be impractical for such a powerful remedy
to be granted on a mere “likelihood” that the error affected the
outcome of the trial.145
3. The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Clay
The next year, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Clay146
joined the split, agreeing with the Sixth Circuit that the use of
false testimony qualifies as a trial error and is therefore amenable to actual-prejudice analysis under Brecht.147 However, although it was quick to reach a decision on the materiality issue,
the court was also quick to note, as in Rosencrantz, that the Supreme Court could easily change this calculus by deeming such
errors structural due to “the fundamental nature of the injury to
the justice system caused by the knowing use of perjured testimony by the state. . . .”148
The habeas petition in Clay, which centered on a money
laundering and wire fraud scheme, claimed that the government
had knowingly permitted a coconspirator witness to falsely testify about his professional background in contracting and real
estate.149 In applying the Brecht hurdle, the Eighth Circuit explained that any suppressed evidence under this standard must
be analyzed cumulatively and found that, as one of forty witnesses during a weeklong trial, the perjuring witness was not
significant enough to the prosecution to have a “substantial and
injurious effect” on the verdict.150
C. THE THIRD CIRCUIT REJECTS BRECHT FOR PERJUREDTESTIMONY CLAIMS ON COLLATERAL REVIEW
The Ninth Circuit remained alone in its support of the unmodified reasonable-likelihood standard until 2017, when the
145. See id. at 1111, 1117; see also O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437–
38 (1995) (“If, when all is said and done, the [court’s] conviction is sure that the
error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the
judgment should stand.” (alteration in original) (quoting Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 764–65 (1946))).
146. 720 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 2013).
147. Id. at 1026–27.
148. Id. at 1026 (quoting Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 589 (6th Cir.
2009)).
149. Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit seemed to believe that the knowinguse-of-perjured-testimony claim had already been procedurally defaulted when
the petitioner failed to raise the issue at the hearing on his motion for a new
trial. The court resolved to address the claim on its merits only because the
government failed to raise the issue. Id. at 1025 n.2.
150. Id. at 1028 (quoting O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 436).
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Third Circuit stepped up to the plate. In Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI,151 the Third Circuit was required to evaluate a
perjured-testimony claim in which the prosecutor not only knowingly presented false testimony about consideration received by
a key witness, but repeatedly emphasized these lies to the
jury.152
This, of course, is the case of Vance Haskell and eyewitness
Antoinette Blue described in the Introduction.153 After Blue’s
performance at both the pretrial and trial hearings, the prosecutor in the Erie murder case, with the help of Erie police detectives and a district attorney from Mercer County, assisted Blue
in securing more favorable outcomes on pending charges in Erie
and Mercer Counties.154 However, when questioned on the stand
by defense counsel, Blue denied having any pending charges, or
expecting or receiving any assistance or consideration for her
testimony.155 Despite having explicit knowledge to the contrary,
the prosecutor not only failed to correct Blue’s false statements,
but also doubled down on her credibility in his closing argument,
openly “ridicul[ing] the idea that [she] would benefit from her
testimony.”156 Defense counsel only learned two decades after
Haskell’s conviction that Blue was facing charges in two counties
when she came forward with her eyewitness account, four years
after the crime, of the shooter’s alleged identity.157
In its analysis, the Third Circuit emphasized that even if the
perjured testimony only goes toward the credibility of the witness, credibility matters.158 As the Supreme Court once put it:
“Had the jury been apprised of the true facts . . . it might well
151. 866 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2017).
152. See id.
153. See supra Introduction.
154. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 143–45.
155. Id. at 143.
156. Id. at 144.
157. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 26–29, 39–40, Commonwealth v.
Haskell, No. 809 WDA 2012, 2013 WL 11256405 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012).
158. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 147ee also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269
(1959) (“The jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness
may well be determinative of guilt or innocence . . . .”). Other courts have found
the same. Compare Shih Wei Su v. Filion, 335 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding materiality in false testimony where the lying witness was “[the] prosecution’s chief witness” and the “conviction depended significantly on [the lying
witness’s] testimony”) (first alteration in original), with Foley v. Parker, 488
F.3d 377, 392 (6th Cir. 2007) (denying habeas relief where perjured testimony
was immaterial because the lying witness “was not a crucial link in the case
against [the petitioner]”).
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have concluded that [the witness] had fabricated testimony in
order to curry the favor of the very representative of the State
who was prosecuting the case in which [he] was testifying . . . .”159 Analyzing the case under the unmodified Agurs
standard, the Third Circuit found it reasonably likely that the
jury’s judgment could have been affected by such evidentiary
suppression.160 Blue was a key government witness presenting
important testimony against the petitioner.161 The State highlighted its own belief in her subjective importance to the case by
vouching for her credibility at closing arguments, despite knowing that she had lied on the stand.162 Relative to the rest of the
evidence in the case, Blue’s testimony was strong—she was the
only eyewitness willing and able to consistently identify Haskell
as the shooter.163 These factors speak to the weight and significance of Blue’s testimony and highlight how valuable impeachment evidence regarding her credibility in testifying would have
been to defense counsel as they argued for reasonable doubt.
In assessing the current state of the law, the Third Circuit
embraced the same interpretation of Kyles v. Whitley as the
Ninth Circuit had a dozen years earlier, finding that additional
actual-prejudice analysis is not needed for any materiality
standard that already contains harmless-error analysis. The implication of Bagley, the Third Circuit explains, was that “for perjured-testimony claims raised in [habeas] proceedings, the materiality and harmless-error standards are one and the same;”164
therefore actual prejudice does not apply to such claims, just as
it did not apply to the evidentiary-withholding claims highlighted in Kyles.165 For the three types of prosecutorial misconduct originally distinguished by Agurs, the materiality and
harmless-error standards merge, meaning there is no need, nor
room, to conduct a separate harmless-error test under Brecht—
because it is already baked into the test for materiality.166

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
(1985).
166.

Napue, 360 U.S. at 270.
Haskell, 866 F.3d at 146.
Id. at 145–46.
Id. at 143–45.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 149.
See id. at 149–50; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 679
Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 985 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Furthermore, the Third Circuit explained, the policy concerns extrapolated in Brecht do not apply to knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony claims.167 Brecht was motivated by the Court’s
concern about verdict finality, federal intrusion onto state decisions, and degradation of trial prominence and the rarity of habeas relief.168 While federalism concerns loom large, the Third
Circuit observed no pressing need to honor previous state court
decisions when the knowing use of perjured testimony represents “a bad-faith effort to deprive the defendant of his right to
due process and obtain a conviction through deceit”169 and is considered “fundamentally unfair” by the Supreme Court.170
With regards to finality, the Third Circuit points out that
the entire point of habeas relief (“an extraordinary remedy”) is
to protect and endorse the values of justice and fundamental
fairness.171 The Third Circuit disputes the argument that a
lower materiality standard for federal habeas claims would degrade the prominence of trial, pointing out that this standard
would only apply to a small percentage of perjured-testimony
claims: those that did not or could not arise at trial or upon direct
review.172 The vast majority of perjured-testimony claims will
continue to be litigated at the trial level, rather than years later
upon collateral review. Meanwhile, direct review has a finite

167. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 151–52.
168. Id. (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 19, 635 (1993)).
169. Id. at 151.
170. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678–79 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 103 (1976)).
171. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 151 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633).
172. Id. (noting that “it is possible, even likely, that petitioners will not know
of the prosecution’s use of perjured testimony until after the opportunity for
direct review has passed”). From a commonsense standpoint, most incarcerated
petitioners would not wait decades to raise a knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony claim unless those elapsed years represented the time it took for defense
counsel to learn of the error.
The Brecht Court is not alone in expressing anxiety over the degrading
prominence of trial. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88–90 (1977) (arguing that a state trial should be the “decisive event” in determining guilt); Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 639 (2d Cir. 1980) (arguing that “all issues should
be fully aired at the trial, with no inducement for the defendant . . . to withhold
certain issues in the hope of later obtaining a more favorable ruling from a federal court”). However, as the number of jury trials continues to decline in the
American judicial system, this argument perhaps holds less weight. For more
on the diminishing prominence of the jury trial, see Benjamin Weiser, Trial by
Jury, a Hallowed American Right, Is Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016),
https://nyti.ms/2aNeei4 (noting a fifty percent decrease in the number of jury
verdicts in New York State Court between 1984 and 2015).
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statute of limitations, making it much more likely that a petitioner will remain unaware of the occurrence of one of these errors until long after the period for direct review has tolled.173
Finally, there was no binding precedent holding the Third
Circuit to the heightened Brecht standard. Although the Circuit
had once before applied the Brecht standard to a habeas petition
similar to the one in Haskell, that case resolved before Kyles v.
Whitley and was later vacated under new law.174 The Circuit’s
decision may have weighed policy heavier than precedent, but in
light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hayes v. Brown, the Third
Circuit was well within its discretion to join the minority split.
The whole point of cases like Napue and Giglio, the Third Circuit
argued, was to acknowledge the fundamental injustice created
by the government’s knowing presentation of false testimony at
trial.175 Because Brady violations bring the substantive fairness
of trial into question, any violation found material can never be
harmless under Brecht.
III. IN SUPPORT OF A MORE FLEXIBLE STANDARD FOR
PERJURED-TESTIMONY CLAIMS
The Third Circuit was correct to reject the application of the
Brecht actual-prejudice hurdle to knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony claims raised by habeas petitioners on collateral review.
The other Circuits, including those presently undecided, should
join the Third and Ninth Circuits in adopting the unmodified
reasonable-likelihood materiality standard for such claims.
By adding a second prong to the materiality standard initially created by Agurs, courts take a bright-line exemption applicable to all Brady violations and destroy it by adding an ex
post level of analysis to a small subsection of claims. Because
habeas petitioners already bear the shifted burden of proof on
collateral review,176 adding an extra hurdle to the path faced by

173. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
174. Robinson v. Arvonio, 27 F.3d 877, 886 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. granted, vacated, 513 U.S. 1186 (1995).
175. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 145–46 (“A state violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee when it knowingly presents or fails to correct false
testimony in a criminal proceeding.” (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269
(1959)); see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972); see also Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 593 (6th Cir. 2009) (Cole, J., dissenting) (“The
whole purpose of the Giglio-materiality test is to identify those due process
harms requiring post-conviction relief.” (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153–54)).
176. Haskell, 866 F.3d at 148; see also Blume & Garvey, supra note 42, at
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habeas petitioners does nothing more than reward prosecutors
for successfully obfuscating justice until the appeals period has
tolled. By presenting false testimony, the government deprives
defendants of any chance at a fair trial. The willful abuse of prosecutorial discretion, including through the knowing or negligent
use of perjured testimony, should be a grave enough concern to
justify the lower standard for such claims under habeas review.
This Part offers a solution to the ongoing Circuit split over
the level of materiality analysis required for perjured-testimony
claims raised on collateral review. Section A explains why the
existing reasonable-likelihood standard offers a sufficient degree
of protection for finality and federalism, and argues that a second level of actual-prejudice analysis need not be added to the
standard materiality measure for perjured-testimony claims.
Section B then argues that the Supreme Court should resolve
the confusion left by Kyles v. Whitley by specifically exempting
perjured-testimony claims from the Brecht actual-prejudice hurdle, while Section C examines an alternative solution posed by
several of the Circuits that suggests that the Supreme Court
step in and recategorize the knowing use of perjured testimony
as a structural error subject to immediate reversal.
A. THE REASONABLE-LIKELIHOOD STANDARD SUFFICIENTLY
MEETS THE NEEDS OF HARMLESS-ERROR ANALYSIS FOR
PERJURED-TESTIMONY CLAIMS
Much of the confusion between the Circuits comes down to
the Court’s actions in Kyles v. Whitley.177 Following an exhaustive analysis, the Court in Kyles concluded that the reasonableprobability standard used by the Brady evidentiary-withholding
violations at bar fully satisfied the need for harmless-error analysis and that such claims were therefore exempt from added
analysis under Brecht.178 With no knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony claim before it, the Court declined to extend its holding
to the last category of Brady trial errors.179 However, even
though “reasonable probability” is a narrower standard than
“reasonable likelihood,” the Court’s arguments against Brecht
could easily be extended to the knowing use of perjured testimony. The Court itself recognized that the reasonable-likelihood
169 (“[T]he burden of proof within the law of harmless error represents a probability of prejudice, or a probability of another probability.”).
177. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
178. See id. at 437.
179. See id. at n.7.
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standard, when used for perjured-testimony claims, produces results equivalent to harmless-error analysis (in the form of another harmless-error test, Chapman’s “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard).180 In fact, the Court several years
earlier recognized that this softer standard for perjured-testimony claims was justified by the level of prosecutorial misconduct and “corruption of the truth-seeking function” such claims
presented.181
The Court in United States v. Bagley sought to retain the
“less onerous” reasonable-likelihood standard for perjured-testimony claims for a reason.182 Yet, after Kyles, a majority of decided Circuits would have petitioners believe that the only Brady
claims facing added scrutiny on collateral review were perjuredtestimony claims.183 Despite the clear intent of the Supreme
Court in Agurs and Bagley to wrangle the use of false testimony
by unscrupulous prosecutors,184 the pro-Brecht Circuits accept
only the reluctant dicta put forth by the Court in Kyles,185 arguing that because the Kyles Court declined to specifically extend
its ruling to an issue not before it, the issue must by default be
controlled by Brecht.186 But the question is moot—Kyles states
that the actual-prejudice hurdle need not apply if harmless-error
analysis is already present in the existing standard.187 Despite
180. In 1985, the Supreme Court observed that “this Court’s precedents indicate that the standard of review applicable to the knowing use of perjured
testimony is equivalent to the Chapman harmless-error standard.” United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 n.9 (1985). See generally Blume & Garvey,
supra note 42, at 164.
181. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
104 (1976)).
182. United States v. Clay, 720 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir. 2013).
183. See supra Part II.B.
184. See Bagley, 473 U.S. 667; Agurs, 427 U.S. 97.
185. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 431–33 nn.6–7 (1995) (declining to
“consider the question whether Kyles’s conviction was obtained by the knowing
use of perjured testimony” because the issue was not before the Court).
186. See, e.g., Trepal v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 1088, 1112–13
(11th Cir. 2012) (“We note that no Brecht analysis is needed for Brady violations, for the Supreme Court has held that a showing of materiality under Brady
necessarily establishes actual prejudice under Brecht.” (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at
435)).
187. See id. at 435 (“Assuming . . . that a harmless-error enquiry were to
apply, a Bagley error could not be treated as harmless, since ‘a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different[ ] ’ . . . necessarily entails the conclusion that
the suppression must have had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict[ ] ’ . . . .” (first quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682;
and then quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993))).
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the Court’s reluctance to explicitly extend this holding beyond
the scope of the reasonable-probability standard, this logic holds
true. The reasonable-likelihood standard is sufficiently capable
of meeting the goals of harmless-error analysis on collateral review, and adding an unnecessary second prong to the materiality
test laid out by Agurs fails to serve the intent of the Court.
B. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE CONFUSION
CREATED BY KYLES V. WHITLEY
There are several reasons why the Supreme Court should
grant certiorari and resolve the issue left dangling by Kyles v.
Whitley by exempting perjured-testimony claims raised by habeas petitioners from the added Brecht hurdle. First, as explained above, harmless-error analysis is already present in the
existing materiality standard for perjured testimony.188 In 1985,
the Supreme Court found that the reasonable-likelihood standard for knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony claims was “equivalent to the Chapman harmless-error standard,” containing builtin harmless-error analysis.189 This confirms that there is no need
to apply the Brecht hurdle to any claims with an existing harmless-error materiality standard.
Second, collateral review represents a last chance at liberty
for petitioners who have exhausted all other appellate and postconviction options.190 The writ of habeas corpus has been under
attack in federal courts since the mid-1980s.191 Indeed, many
scholars consider post-conviction habeas relief “all but a dead
letter” in the modern jurisprudence.192 This can be credited to a
number of changes in the criminal justice system, including increasing criminalization of certain acts and creation of new requirements designed to limit federal habeas filings.193

188. See supra Part III.A.
189. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680 n.9.
190. Cf. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633 (calling habeas relief “an extraordinary remedy”).
191. See generally Gershman, supra note 16 (describing the obstacles imposed by the Supreme Court which “block[ed]” habeas claims in cases from the
1980s).
192. Carlos M. Vazquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, The Constitutional Right to
Collateral Post-Conviction Review, 103 VA. L. REV. 905, 906 (2017) (“For years,
the prevailing academic and judicial wisdom has held that, between them, Congress and the Supreme Court have rendered post-conviction habeas review all
but a dead letter.”).
193. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.

1598

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:1567

If the prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony does not
come to light early enough in the appeals process, the petitioner
may lose all opportunities to raise the issue under the unmodified Agurs reasonable-likelihood standard. Habeas scholars
John Blume and Stephen Garvey argue that “Brecht increases
the incentive for prosecutors to ignore or willfully neglect constitutional limits and to commit constitutional error.”194 The government’s failure to correct false testimony before a conviction is
entered deprives these petitioners of both a fair trial and any
chance at a productive appeal.
Third, while federalism and finality are real concerns, the
Third Circuit rightly points out that the entire purpose of habeas
relief is to protect and endorse the values of justice and fundamental fairness.195 When petitioners do raise perjured-testimony
claims later in the appeals process, it is often because that is
when they first learn of the error. In Rosencrantz, for example,
the petitioner was only alerted that the victim lied under oath,
and that prosecutors knowingly permitted this false testimony,
through an affidavit submitted by a former Sheriff’s Department employee who interviewed the victim in jail before, during,
and after her meetings with police detectives and an identified
prosecutor.196 In Trepal, an expert witness’s act of perjury only
became public knowledge after an investigative report was filed
by the state attorney general.197 In both cases, the likelihood of
the state’s misconduct coming to light on its own was next to nil,
causing one to wonder exactly how many potential habeas petitioners face this precise situation and never learn of it.
Fourth, pro-Brecht Circuits interpret the Supreme Court’s
reluctance to act in Kyles as an implicit adoption of the actualprejudice hurdle for perjured-testimony claims.198 But reading
Kyles in this way creates a bizarre world wherein, upon reaching
the court of last resort, the discovery of an unintended nondisclosure will face a lower materiality hurdle than a Brady error
caused by state deception.199 In this world, a habeas petitioner
194. Blume & Garvey, supra note 42, at 188.
195. Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 139, 151 (3d Cir.
2017).
196. Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 2009).
197. Trepal v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 1088, 1100–01 (11th Cir.
2012).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Clay, 720 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir. 2013);
Trepal, 684 F.3d at 1112 n.29; Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 589; Gilday v. Callahan,
59 F.3d 257, 267–68 (1st Cir. 1995).
199. Compare Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432–40 (1995) (analyzing the
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alleging inadvertent evidentiary withholding need only to show
that a reasonable jury would hypothetically have been affected
by the truth. Yet, this same interpretation would require a petitioner alleging acts of intentional deception by the state to show
that a reasonable jury not only could have been affected by the
truth, but that the false testimony presented caused actual prejudice in the petitioner’s case.
Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kyles to limit the
application of the actual-prejudice hurdle represented a sudden
about-face by the Court just two years after it decided Brecht.200
One reason for this shift might be found in the Court’s makeup
at that time. Despite the short time between the two cases, the
Court’s lineup had shifted by twenty-five percent, with Justice
Blackmun and Justice White retiring and Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Breyer joining the bench. Both Kyles and Brecht came
down as 5–4 decisions, with Justice Stevens filing a concurring
opinion on both.201 In 2018, just one of the original five majority
votes on Brecht (Justice Thomas) and two of the original five majority votes on Kyles (Justices Ginsburg and Breyer) remain.202
Justice Stevens, the swing vote in both cases, retired in 2010.203
As the Supreme Court continues to face questions about the
treatment of perjured testimony discovered after conviction is
entered, the time is right for the Court to readdress the issue of

prosecution’s inadvertent failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defense
under the “reasonable probability” standard of materiality when raised on federal collateral review), and Vaughn v. United States, 93 A.3d 1237, 1254 (D.C.
2014) (analyzing the prosecution’s failure to disclose favorable impeachment evidence about a key State witness under the “reasonable probability” standard
when raised on direct appeal), with Woodall v. United States, 842 A.2d 690, 696
(D.C. 2004) (analyzing appellant’s claim that the prosecution knowingly presented false testimony under the “reasonable likelihood” standard when raised
on direct appeal), and United States v. Clay, 720 F.3d 1021, 1026–27 (8th Cir.
2013) (analyzing the prosecution’s knowing use of perjured testimony under the
“actual prejudice” standard when raised by a habeas petitioner on federal collateral review).
200. See supra Part I.D.2.
201. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 454–56 (Stevens, J., concurring); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 639–44 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring).
202. Current Members, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
biographies.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2018); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421–54
(majority opinion by J. Souter, J. Stevens, J. Ginsburg, J. Breyer, and J. O’Connor); Brecht, 507 U.S. at 621–39 (majority opinion by J. Rehnquist, J. Stevens,
J. Scalia, J. Thomas, and J. Kennedy).
203. Nina Totenberg, For Decades, Stevens Molded High Court Rulings,
NPR (Apr. 9, 2010), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
123075821.
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prosecutorial misconduct on collateral review.204 By moving to
exempt perjured-testimony claims on collateral review from actual-prejudice analysis, the Court would resolve two decades of
confusion left by the interaction between Agurs, Brecht, and
Kyles. The Court has previously found that harmless-error analysis already exists in the reasonable-likelihood standard. By
clarifying existing doctrine and expressly expanding the Brecht
exemption to all Brady violations, the Court will act in support
of long-standing policy concerns and take a hard stance against
the imbalance of power and inherent unfairness created when
the state withholds vital information about witness testimony
from defendants.
C. ALTERNATELY, THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RECATEGORIZE
THE KNOWING USE OF PERJURED TESTIMONY AS A FORM OF
STRUCTURAL ERROR
Several of the pro-Brecht Circuits, displaying sympathy over
the injustice to criminal defendants presented by the state’s
knowing use of false testimony, have invited the Supreme Court
to take up the issue and reclassify the knowing presentation of
false testimony as a structural error, on par with judicial or racial bias.205 Indeed, this would appear to present an elegant solution to the issue.
Structural errors, like denial of the right to counsel, are not
subject to harmless-error review.206 The rationale for this is
204. See, e.g., Long v. Pfister, 874 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding that the
prosecution failed to correct false testimony by a witness but declining to grant
collateral relief where the Supreme Court had not taken a firm stance on the
issue), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1593 (2018). The Third Circuit’s decision and rationale in Haskell were heavily cited by the briefs in this petition for certiorari.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Long, 138 S. Ct. 1593 (mem.) (2018) (No. 17991); Brief in Opposition, Long, 138 S. Ct. 1593 (2018) (No. 17-991).
205. See, e.g., Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 589 (6th Cir. 2009) (declining to deem knowing-use-of-perjured-testimony claims as “structural” errors
because the Supreme Court had not done so). Brecht even leaves the door open
to this, acknowledging that certain scenarios (“deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial type, or one that is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct”) run the risk of so direly “infect[ing] the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant . . . habeas relief, even if [the error] did not substantially
influence the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638 n.9. An example of such a
pattern might be found in the extreme and repeated misconduct of Oklahoma
County District Attorney Robert H. Macy in death penalty cases, yet the Tenth
Circuit repeatedly found his conduct to only meet the level of harmless error.
Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 423
(2007).
206. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629–30.
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structural errors present a far greater risk to the integrity of the
court than constitutional trial errors: “[T]he distinction between
trial error and structural error is based on the truth-seeking
function of the trial process and the reliability of the result
reached through that process.”207 In this sense, unlike the bulk
of Brady violations, which address prosecutorial withholding of
existing evidence, the state’s knowing presentation of false testimony reflects concerns shared by structural errors. Structural
errors “arise from the breach of rules that do not directly regulate the admission of evidence and that serve some purpose other
than promoting reliability.”208 These constitutional rights protected by such structural errors are so inherent, yet so difficult
to safeguard, that “[they] can only be protected and enforced . . . with a rule of automatic reversal.”209 When a prosecutor knowingly presents the fact-finding jury with testimony that
he or she knows to be untrue, this casts the “truth-seeking function” of trial into question.210 Without the safeguard of automatic
reversal, violations of the rules against prosecutorial misconduct
would have to be subjected to actual-prejudice analysis, “in essence convert[ing] the rights supported by these rules into rights
without remedies.”211
However, despite the strength of arguments that the state’s
knowing use of perjured testimony presents a risk to the ultimate fairness of trial on par with other structural errors, such a
recategorization could have a dramatic impact on the landscape
of post-conviction relief. The ability to find an alleged Brady violation immaterial and thus harmless makes sense when considering the Court’s interest in finality and its expressed disinterest
in seeing cases relitigated. The reasonable-likelihood standard
maintains harmlessness as an option, while leaving ample room
for petitioners to seek justice, and should therefore be preserved.
CONCLUSION
The writ of habeas corpus seeks to provide a last chance at
freedom for incarcerated individuals; for this reason, the stakes

207. Blume & Garvey, supra note 42, at 185 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991)).
208. Id. at 186.
209. Id. at 186–87.
210. See id. at 185–88 (discussing the possibility of certain prosecutorial misconduct to be so egregious as to undermine the integrity of the proceeding).
211. Id.
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for habeas petitioners are exceptionally high, and there is a substantial risk to liberty in placing an added hurdle in front of habeas petitioners attempting to raise a material claim of prosecutorial misconduct—particularly when these petitioners already
face a shifted burden of proof.
Like the evidentiary-withholding claims in Kyles v. Whitley,
the knowing use of perjured testimony should be exempt from
actual-prejudice analysis on collateral review. Brecht v. Abrahamson attempted to change the game for habeas petitioners.
Yet, the Court has repeatedly recognized that the knowing use
of false testimony against criminal defendants deserves a harder
look than most constitutional trial errors, and there remains little reason to diminish this standard on federal collateral review.
By grouping all Brady prosecutorial misconduct violations under
the same Brecht exemption, the Supreme Court will set a clear
standard of conduct and review for prosecutors in criminal cases.
The Supreme Court should recognize the discrepancy created by Kyles and allow perjured-testimony claims to join the
other Brady violations in discarding actual-prejudice analysis on
collateral review.

